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EXTRAORDINARY WRITS

78-35-1

(2) (a) The real property has been offered for sale to the person or
entity from whom the state or one of its subdivisions acquired it, at
the highest offer with first right of refusal;
(b) The person or entity failed to accept the offer within 90 days
after notification by registered mail to the last known address; and
(c) Neither the state nor the subdivision of the state selling the
property is involved in the rezoning of the property or the acquisition
of additional property to enhance the value of the real property to be
sold.
\
This section shall only apply to property acquired after July 1, 1983.
History: C. 1953, 78-34-20, enacted
1983, ch. 155, § 1.

by L.

Cross-References. - County zoning, Chapter 27 of Title 17.
Municipal zoning, Chapter 9 of Title 10.

CHAPTER 35
EXTRAORDINARY WRITS
Section
78-35-1. Penalty for wrongful refusal to allow
writ of habeas corpus.
78-35-2. Recommitment.
78-35-3. Recommitment after discharge forbidden - Exceptions.
78-35-4. Refusing to exhibit authority for detention - Penalty.
78-35-5. Penalties for wrongful acts of defendant.
78-35-6. Judgment of ouster - Costs - Pen-

78-35-1.

Section
78-35-7.
78-35-8.
78-35-9.
78-35-10.

alty by fine where state is
party.
Judgment against director of corporation - Of induction in favor
of person entitled.
Action for damages because of usurpation - Limitation of action.
Mandamus and prohibition - Judgment.
Disobedience of writ- Punishment.

Penalty for wrongful refusal to allow writ of habeas corpus.

Any judge, whether acting individually or as a member of a court, who
wrongfully and willfully refuses to allow a writ of habeas corpus whenever
proper application for the same has been made shall forfeit and pay a sum not
exceeding $5,000 to the party thereby aggrieved.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-35-1.
Cross-References. - District court's jurisdiction to issue writs, Utah Const., Art. VIII,
Sec. 5; § 78-3-4.
Extradition, time to apply for habeas corpus
allowed, § 77-30-10.
Juvenile court power to determine custody
upon writ, § 78-3a-17.

Mental illness, writ available to one detained for, § 64-7-49.
Procedure, Rule 65B, U.R.C.P.
Supreme Court's jurisdiction to issue writs,
Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 3; § 78-2-2.
Suspension prohibited except in case of rebellion or invasion, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 5.
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JUDICIAL CODE
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Reasons for refusal.
-In writing.
Rule 65B(0(3), U.R.C.P., requiring that reasons for refusal of habeas corpus be stated in

writing, is intended to be of assistance to both
petitioner and judge if petitioner seeks recovery of penalty under this section. Farrell v.
Turner, 25 Utah 2d 351, 482 P.2d 117 (1971).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Corpus § 131.

78-35-2.

C.J.S. - 39A C.J.S. Habeas Corpus§ 175.
Key Numbers. - Habeas Corpus ec> 64. 1

Recommitment.

In all cases where it is claimed that a person is illegally or wrongfully
restrained or deprived of his liberty, where such restraint or imprisonment is
for a criminal offense and there is not sufficient cause for discharge (even
though the commitment may have been informally made or without due authority, or the process may have been executed by a person not duly authorized) the court or judge may make a new commitment, or admit the party to
bail, if the case is bailable. And all material witnesses shall also be required
to enter into a recognizance to appear at the same time and place and not
depart therefrom without leave. All such papers must be filed in the clerk's
office where the same are made returnable.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-35-2.

Cross-References.
Title 77.

-

Bail, Chapter 20 of

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Conditional discharge from one of several
sentences.
-Remand to custody.
Where petitioner for habeas corpus admitted
he was legally held under judgment convicting
him of burglary, but contended that he was
illegally held under judgment convicting him
of murder and imposing life sentence, and it
appeared that conviction for murder was invalid, prisoner would be conditionally dis-

charged from sentence for life imprisonment,
but would be remanded to custody of warden
upon sentence of burglary to be held by warden
upon sentence until released according to law;
the discharge from the life sentence should,
however, not be absolute, so that at expiration
of burglary sentence, petitioner should be delivered to sheriff to be dealt with under charge
of murder. Connors v. Pratt, 38 Utah 258, 112
P. 399 (1910).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Corpus § 30.
C.J.S. - 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 36.

78-35-3.

Recommitment
ceptions.

Key Numbers. -

(2).

after discharge

Habeas Corpus

forbidden -

ec>

30(1),

Ex-

No person who has been discharged by order of the court or judge upon
habeas corpus shall be again imprisoned, restrained, or kept in custody for the
same cause, except in the following cases:
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(1) if he has been discharged from custody on a criminal charge and is
afterward committed for the same offense by legal order or process.
(2) if, after discharge for defect [of] proof or for any defect of the process, warrant or commitment in a criminal case, the prisoner is again
arrested on sufficient proof and committed by legal process for the same
offense.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-35-3.

Cross-References. Double jeopardy,
Utah Cons\, Art. I, Sec. 12.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Unconditional discharge.
-Stay pending appeal.
In habeas corpus proceeding, court may not,
pending appeal, supersede or stay judgment of

unconditional discharge of prisoner. Dickson v.
Mullings, 66 Utah 282, 241 P. 840, 43 A.L.R.
136 (1925).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Corpus § 161.

78-35-4. Refusing
Penalty.

C.J.S. - 39A C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 187.
Key Numbers. - Habeas Corpus e=> 109.

to exhibit

authority

for detention

-

A person refusing to deliver a copy of the legal process by which he detains
the plaintiff in custody to anyone who demands such copy for the purpose of
taking out a writ of habeas corpus shall forfeit not exceeding $200 to the
plaintiff.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-35-4.

Cross-References.
U.R.C.P.

- Procedure, Rule 65B,

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Corpus § 138.
C.J.S. - 39A C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 188.

78-35-5. Penalties

Key Numbers. seq.

Habeas Corpus

e->

12 et

for wrongful acts of defendant.

If the defendant attempts to evade the service of the writ of habeas corpus,
or if the defendant or any officer wilfully fails to comply with the legal duties
imposed upon him, or if he disobeys the order of discharge, he is guilty of a
class A misdemeanor, and shall also forfeit to the person aggrieved not more
than $5,000. Any person knowingly aiding in or abetting invalidation of this
section is subject to the same punishment and forfeiture.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-35-5; 1986, ch. 178, § 66.
Amendment Notes. - The 1986 amendment substituted "is guilty of a class A misdemeanor" for "shall be imprisoned in the county
jail for a period of not more than one year and

fined not exceeding $1,000" in the first sentence and "invalidation of this section is subject to th~ same" for "any such act shall be
subject to a like" in the second sentence.
Cross-References. - Penalty for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-204, 76-3-301.
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Procedure, Rule 65B, U.R.C.P.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Corpus §§ 176, 177.

78-35-6.

C.J.S. - 39A C.J.S. Habeas Corpus §§ 187,
188.
Key Numbers. - Habeas Corpus
68.

Judgment of ouster where state is party.

Costs -

Penalty by fine

When a defendant is found guilty of usurping, intruding into or unlawfully
holding or exercising an office, franchise or privilege, judgment shall be rendered that such defendant be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom, and
that the relator recover his costs. The court may also, in its discretion, in
actions to which the state is a party impose upon the defendant a fine not
exceeding $5,000, which fine when collected must be paid into the state treasury.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-35-6.
Cross-References.
- Attorney licensing
and disciplinary provisions, enforcement by
quo. warranto, § 78-51-25.
Control of public funds by state treasurer,
§§ 51-7-4, 51-7-5.

District court's jurisdiction to issue writs,
Utah Const., Art. VITI, Sec. 5; § 78-3-4.
Execution of quo warranto judgment not to
be stayed pending appeal, Rule 62(£), U.R.C.P.
Procedure, Rule 65B, U.R.C.P.
Supreme Court's jurisdiction to issue writs,
Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec 3; § 78-2-2.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 63A Am. Jur. 2d Public Officers and Employees§§ 147, 148; 65 Am. Jur.
2d Quo Warranto §§ 116 to 118.

78-35-7.

Judgment
induction

C.J.S. - 67 C.J.S. Officers § 82; 74 C.J.S.
Quo Warranto § 7 et seq.
Key Numbers. - Officers e,, 80; Quo Warranto e,, 12, 20.

against director of corporation
in favor of person entitled.

-

Of

When the action is against a director of a corporation, and the court finds
that, at his election, either illegal votes were received or legal votes were
rejected, or both, sufficient to change the result, judgment may be rendered
that the defendant be ousted, and judgment of induction entered in favor of
the person who was entitled to be declared elected at such election.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-35-7.

(

Cross-References. - Removal of directors
by shareholders, § 16-10-37.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
Relief in equity.
Court of equity, having properly obtained jurisdiction in stockholders' suit for cancellation
of stock fraudulently issued for voting purposes, could give complete relief as requested
by ousting one group as directors who had been

elected by virtue of such stock and declaring
that another group had been elected, even
though quo warranto ordinarily was proper
remedy to try title to office. Floor v. Johnson,
114 Utah 313, 199 P.2d 547 (1948).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 18B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1402; 65 Am. Jur. 2d Quo Warranto
§ 32.

78-35-8.

C.J.S. - 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 725; 74
C.J.S. Quo Warranto § 9.
Key Numbers. - Corporations <1=>283(3);
Quo Warranto e=> 20.

Action for damages because of usurpation - Limitation of action.

Such person may, at any time within one year after the date of such judgment, bring an action against the party ousted and recover the damages he
sustained by reason of such usurpation.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-35-8.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C.J.S. - 74 C.J.S. Quo Warranto §§ 22, 49.
Key Numbers. - Quo Warranto <1=>29.

Am. Jur. 2d. - 65 Am. Jur. 2d Quo Warranto §§ 54, 117.

78-35-9.

Mandamus

and prohibition

-

Judgment.

In any proceeding to obtain a writ of mandate or prohibition, if judgment is
given for the applicant, he may recover the damages which he has sustained,
as found by the jury, or as may be determined by the court, or referees upon a
reference ordered, together with costs; and for such damages and costs an
execution may issue, and a peremptory mandate must also be awarded without delay.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-35-9.
Cross-References. - District court's jurisdiction to issue writs, Utah Const., Art. VIII,
Sec. 5; § 78-3-4.
Execution and proceedings supplemental
thereto, Rule 69, U.R.C.P.
Insurance
comm1ss10ner,
mandamus
against, § 31A-2-306.
Irrigation districts, mandamus, § 73-7-3.
Limitations of action, effect of prohibition
on, § 78-12-41.

Masters, Rule 53, U.R.C.P.
Procedure, Rule 65B, U.R.C.P.
Public Service Commission, mandamus,
§ 54-7-16.
•
Securities commission, § 61-1-20.
State building and expansion programs,
mandamus, §§ 63-32-19, 63-32-73.
Supreme Court's jurisdiction to issue writs,
Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 3; § 78-2-2.
Taxing units not conforming with uniform
system of accounts, mandamus, § 59-20-3.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS

I

ANALYSIS

Condemnation of damaged land.
-Governmental
immunity.
Costs.
-Certificate
of election.
-Discretionary.
-Party inducing proceedings.
-Real party in interest.
-Recovery from court or judge.
--Allowed.
--Not
allowed.
Damages.
-Attorney
fees.

Condemnation

of damaged land.

-Governmental
immunity.
Where plaintiffs land was damaged as a consequence of governmental taking of other
lands to build highway, plaintiffs could not obtain compensation for such damage in a direct
suit against the state because of governmental
immunity, and neither could they obtain d~mages by seeking a writ of mandamus ordermg
the state to condemn damaged land and thus
obtain compensation. Sine v. Helland, 18 Utah
2d 222, 418 P.2d 979 (1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 992, 87 S. Ct. 1306 18 L. Ed. 2d 336
(1967).
Costs.
-Certificate
of election.
Mandamus to compel issuance to plaintiff of
certificate of election as delegate to constitutional convention was "special proceeding"
within statute allowing costs as of course to
successful plaintiff in such proceeding. Page v.
Letcher, 11 Utah 119, 39 P. 499 (1895).
-Discretionary.
Awarding of costs in mandamus proceedings
is discretionary with court. State v. Ritchie, 32
Utah 381, 91 P. 24 (1907); Towler v. Warenski,
59 Utah 532, 205 P. 330 (1922).
Party inducing proceedings.
Where alternative writ of mandate was issued to district court requiring it to make findings and to render judgment in cause, and district court made findings and rendered judgment from which appeal was taken, costs on
dismissal would be taxed to party which induced and defended mandamus proceedings.
Salt Lake Inv. Co. v. Fox, 38 Utah 309, 112 P.
808 (1910).

-

-Real party in interest.
In mandamus proceeding against district
court judge to reinstate appeal from justice's
court, where it appeared that real party in interest had suggested to district court that it
had no jurisdiction to hear appeal, and court
had concurred in this view and entered judgment accordingly, held, costs would not be
taxed against such party where he did not appear in proceedings, and judge had opposed reinstatement of appeal only to settle the law.
State v. Ritchie, 32 Utah 381, 91 P. 24 (1907).
-Recovery

from court or judge.

--Allowed.
If judgment was in favor of applicant, he was
entitled to costs as a matter of course, even as
against a public officer, at least where officer
acted arbitrarily, capriciously and in bad faith.
It had, however, been the policy in this jurisdiction not to allow costs against the court or
judge. It was within court's discretion to award
costs both in trial court and on appeal. Fowler
v. Gillman, 76 Utah 414, 290 P. 358 (1930).
--Not
allowed.
In proceeding for issuance of alternative writ
of mandate requiring district judge to reinstate
and try action dismissed by him on appeal from
justice court, held, plaintiff was entitled to recover costs as against all defendants other than
district judge. State v. District Court, 39 Utah
1, 114 P. 143 (1911).
Damages.
-Attorney fees.
In mandamus proceeding, "damages" which
applicant could recover included attorney's
fees, where properly shown. Colorado Dev. Co.
v. Creer, 96 Utah 1, 80 P.2d 914 (1938).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 52 Am. Jur. 2d Mandamus

§ 495 et seq.; 63A Am. Jur. 2d Prohibition
§ 88 et seq.

C.J.S. - 55 C.J.S. Mandamus§§ 342, 375 et
seq.; 73 C.J.S. Prohibition §§ 49, 51.
A.L.R. - Deprival of office or employment,

78-35-10.

Disobedience

damages recoverable by successful plaintiff or
relator in mandamus, 73 A.L.R.2d 921.
Attorneys' fees in mandamus proceedings, 34
A.L.R.4th 457.
Key Numbers. - Mandamus e=, 177, 190;
Prohibition e=, 28, 35.

of writ -

Punishment.

When a peremptory writ of mandate or writ of prohibition has been issued
and directed to an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person, if it appears
to the court that any member of such tribunal, corporation, board or person
upon whom such writ has been personally served has, without just excuse,
refused or neglected to obey the same, the court may, upon motion, impose a
fine not exceeding $500. In cases of persistence in a refusal of obedience, the
court may order the party to be imprisoned until the writ is obeyed, and may
make any orders necessary and proper for the complete enforcement of the
•
writ.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-35-10.

Cross-References.
Imprisonment
compel performance, § 78-32-12.

to

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 52 Am. Jur. 2d Mandamus
§ 482; 63A Am. Jur. 2d Prohibition § 93.
C.J.S. - 55 C.J.S. Mandamus §§ 360, 361;
73 C.J.S. Prohibition § 52.

Key Numbers. - Mandamus
bition e=- 33.

«a> 186;

Prohi-

CHAPTER 36
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER
Section
78-36-1. "Forcible entry" defined.
78-36-2. "Forcible detainer" defined.
78-36-3. Unlawful detainer by tenant for
term less than life.
78-36-4. Right of tenant of agricultural lands
to hold over.
78-36-5. Remedies
available
to tenant
against undertenant.
78-36-6. Notice to quit - How served.
78-36-7. Necessary parties defendant.
78-36-8. Allegations permitted in complaint
- Time for appearance - Service of summons.
78-36-8.5. Possession bond of plaintiff - Alternative remedies.

Section
78-36-9. Proof required by plaintiff - Defense.
78-36-10. Judgment for restitution, damages,
and rent - Immediate enforcement - Treble damages.
78-36-11. Time for appeal.
78-36-12. Exclusion of tenant without judicial
process prohibited Abandoned premises excepted.
78-36-12.3. Definitions.
78-36-12.6. Abandoned premises - Retaking
and rerenting by owner - Liability of tenant - Personal
property of tenant left on premises.
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"Forcible entry" defined.

Every person is guilty of a forcible entry, who either:
(1) by breaking open doors, windows or other parts of a house, or by
fraud, intimidation or stealth, or by any kind of violence or circumstances
of terror, enters upon or into any real property; or,
(2) after entering peaceably upon real property, turns out by force,
threats or menacing conduct the party in actual possession.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-36-1.

Cross-References. - Burglary and criminal trespass, §§ 76-6-201 to 76-6-206.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Damages.
-Mental anguish.
-Nominal.
Forcible detainer distinguished.
Landlord and tenant.
-Contract rights.
-Motel operator and occupant.
--Unlawful
eviction.
Policy of section.
-Abolishment
of common-law.
Purpose of provisions.
-Preventing
disturbances of peace.
-Summary
remedy.
--Rent.
Separate tort action.
What constitutes forcible entry.
-Removal of doors.

Damages.
-Mental anguish.
Tenant who is wrongfully evicted can collect
damages for mental anguish and humiliation.
Mental pain and suffering in connection with a
wrong which apart from such pain and suffering constitutes a cause of action is a proper
element of damages where it is a natural and
proximate consequence of the wrong. Lambert
v. Sine, 123 Utah 145, 256 P.2d 241 (1953).
-Nominal.
The statute places a duty upon any person,
whether entitled to possession or not, not to
use force or stealth or fraud in gaining possession of realty. Correspondingly, it creates a
right in the person in actual peaceable possession not to have his possession disturbed other
than by legal process. Therefore, regardless of
his lack of entitlement to the property, the tenant has a cause of action for the invasion of
that right. Where no actual damages are
proved he should be awarded nominal damages
to preserve the right. King v. Firm, 3 Utah 2d
419, 285 P.2d 1114 (1955).

Forcible detainer distinguished.
Forcible entry and forcible detainer, while
often spoken of together, are in fact separate
and distinct wrongs. Buchanan v. Crites, 106
Utah 428, 150 P.2d 100, 154 A.L.R. 167 (1944).
Landlord and tenant.
-Contract rights.
Anyone committing acts specifically prohibited under this section would be guilty of forcible entry including a party who may by contract be authorized to enter or an owner who as
a matter oflaw may have a right to possession;
contract purporting to establish right of reentry for default of rent payments did not give
landlord right to remove employee of tenants
from office and change locks on all doors. Freeway Park Bldg., Inc. v. Western States Whsle.
Supply, 22 Utah 2d 266, 451 P.2d 778 (1969).
-Motel

operator and occupant.

--Unlawful
eviction.
Where evidence disclosed that relationship
between operators of a motel and the occupants
of an apartment therein was one of landlord

532

78-36-2

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER
and tenant, and not one of innkeeper and
guest, the occupants could only be dispossessed
of the apartment by resort to the statutory
remedy of unlawful detainer. When the owner
of the motel locked out the occupants for
unpaid rent, there was an unlawful eviction.
Lambert v. Sine, 123 Utah 145, 256 P.2d 241
(1953).

--Rent.
This chapter provides a summary remedy for
the recovery of real property in case of forcible
entry or the forcible or unlawful detainer
thereof. That is the purpose of the chapter, and
not to deal with the subject of remedies for
rent. The question of rent is drawn into the
statute, not for the purpose of providing a remedy for its recovery, but to complete a case of
unlawful detainer, which is the gist of the action. Voyles v. Straka, 77 Utah 171,292 P. 913
(1930).

Policy of section.
-Abolishment
of common-law.
The forcible entry statute expressed a policy
that no person should enter by force, stealth,
fraud or intimidation, premises of which another had peaceable possession. This had the
effect of taking away the common-law right of
a landlord to possess his own property by no
more force than was necessary and left the one
against whom force was used to pursue his
common-law action. Buchanan v. Crites, 106
Utah 428, 150 P.2~ 100, 154 A.L.R. 167 (1944).
Purpose of provisions.
-Preventing
disturbances of peace.
The forcible entry and detainer statute was
enacted for the primary purpose of preventing
disturbances of the peace brought about
through self-help in the matter of dispossession. King v. Firm, 3 Utah 2d 419, 285 P.2d
1114 (1955).
-Summary remedy.
Purpose of this statute is to provide a speedy
remedy, summary in character, to obtain possession of real property. Paxton v. Fisher, 86
Utah 408, 45 P.2d 903 (1935).

0

Separate tort action.
A landlord who is entitled to possession
must, on the refusal of the tenant to surrender
the premises, resort to the remedy given by
law to secure it. A violation of that duty set by
the statute gives rise to an action for damages,
not in an action under the forcible entry and
detainer statute but as a separate tort. King v.
Firm, 3 Utah 2d 419, 285 P.2d 1114 (1955).
What constitutes

forcible entry.

-Removal
of doors.
Where defendant landlord entered upon the
premises in plaintiffs absence by unlocking
the doors and removing the doors from their
hinges and carrying them away, the weather
being at the time freezing, these facts were
held to sufficiently show a forcible entry. Buchanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 428, 150 P.2d 100,
154 A.L.R. 167 (1944).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - Landlord-Tenant
Law: A Perspective on Reform in Utah, 1981
Utah L. Rev. 727, 738.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 35 Am. Jur. 2d Forcible
Entry and Detainer § 1.

78-36-2.

C.J.S. - 36A C.J.S. Forcible Entry and Detainer §§ 1, 2.
Key Numbers. - Forcible Entry and Detainer eca 4.

"Forcible detainer" defined.

Every person is guilty of a forcible detainer who either:
(1) by force, or by menaces and threats of violence, unlawfully holds
and keeps the possession of any real property, whether the same was
acquired peaceably or otherwise; or,
(2) in the nighttime, or during the absence of the occupants of any real
property, unlawfully enters thereon, and, after demand made for the surrender thereof, refuses for the period of three days to surrender the same
to such former occupant. The occupant of real property within the meaning of this subdivision is one who within five days preceding such unlawful entry was in the peaceable and undisturbed possession of such lands.
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History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-36-2.

Cross-References. - Burglary and criminal trespass, §§ 76-6-201 to 76-6-206.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Consent to entry.
-Evidence.
-Failure of action.
Issues.
-Immediate
right of possession.
Liability.
-Lessor.
-Purchaser.
Occupancy "within five days."
-Allegation.
"Unlawfully enters."
Consent to entry.
-Evidence.
To show intention of parties and acquiescence by plaintiff in defendant's possession, escrow agreement and quitclaim deed executed
by plaintiff were held to be properly admitted
in evidence. Seeley v. Houston, 105 Utah 202,
141 P.2d 880 (1943).
-Failure of action.
As one of the elements of this action is the
unlawful entry, the action must fail if it is
found that defendant entered with consent of
plaintiff. Seeley v. Houston, 105 Utah 202, 141
P.2d 880 (1943).
Issues.
-Immediate
right of possession.
In action of forcible entry and detainer, the
only question involved is the immediate right
to possession. Seeley v. Houston, 105 Utah 202,
141 P.2d 880 (1943).
Liability.
-Lessor.
Where, without serving the three days' notice required by § 78-36-3(3), a lessor entered
the premises of his tenant, whose rent was two
months in arrears, changed the locks on the
doors and refused to allow the tenant to enter
to remove equipment and perishable goods, lessor was guilty of forcible detainer and conversion of the personal property on the premises.
Peterson v. Platt, 16 Utah 2d 330, 400 P.2d 507
(1965).

-Purchaser.
Where purchaser of state land took possession of land while lessee from state was away
and refused to quit premises upon demand, he
was liable for forcible entry and detainer, since
such purchaser should have made proper demand, and if it was refused, should have settled question of possession by law. Paxton v.
Fisher, 86 Utah 408, 45 P.2d 903 (1935); Buchanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 428, 150 P.2d 100,
154 A.L.R. 167 (1944).
Fact that one of defendants in forcible detainer action by lessee of state land had signed
purchase contract covering such land would
not, in itself, make him personally liable. Paxton v. Fisher, 86 Utah 408, 45 P.2d 903 (1935);
Buchanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 428, 150 P.2d
100, 154 A.L.R. 167 (1944).
Occupancy

"within five days."

-Allegation.
Allegation of "more" than five days includes
period of "within" five days. Woodbury v.
Bunker, 98 Utah 216, 98 P.2d 948 (1940);
American Mut. Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Jones, 102
Utah 318, 117 P.2d 293 (1941), rehearing denied, 102 Utah 328, 133 P.2d 332 (1943).
"Unlawfully enters."
"Unlawfully enters" in Subsection (2) means
unlawfully as relating to an occupant who was
there within five days. Woodbury v. Bunker,
98 Utah 216, 98 P.2d 948 (1940); Buchanan v.
Crites, 106 Utah 428, 150 P.2d 100, 154 A.L.R.
167 (1944).

534

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER

78-36-3

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 35 Am. Jur. 2d Forcible
Entry and Detainer § 1.
C.J.S. - 36A C.J.S. Forcible Entry and Detainer §§ 1, 2.

Key Numbers. tainer
5.

Forcible Entry and De-

78-36-3. Unlawful detainer- by tenant for term less than
life.
A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful
detainer:
(1) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of the
property or any part of it, after the expiration of the specified term or
period for which it is let to him which specified term or period, whether
established by express or implied contract, or whether written or parol,
shall he terminated without notice at the expiration of the specified term
or period;
(2) when, having leased real property for an indefinite time with
monthly or other periodic rent reserved:
(a) he continues in possession of it in person or by subtenant after
the end of any month or period, in cases where the owner, his designated agent, or any successor in estate of the owner, 15 days or more
prior to the end of that month or period, has served notice requiring
him to quit the premises at the expiration of that month or period; or
(b) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains in possession of
the premises after the expiration of a notice of not less than five days;
(3) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after
default in the payment of any rent and after a notice in writing requiring
in the alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the detained premises, has remained uncomplied with for a period of three days
after service which notice may be served at any time after the rent becomes due;
(4) when he assigns or sublets the leased premises contrary to the
covenants of the lease, or commits or permits waste on the premises, or
when he sets up or carries on any unlawful business on or in the premises,
or when he suffers, permits, or maintains on or about the premises any
nuisance, and remains in possession after service upon him of a three
days' notice to quit; or
(5) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after a
neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or
agreement under which the property is held, other than those previously
mentioned, and after notice in writing requiring in the alternative the
performance of the conditions or covenant or the surrender of the property, served upon him and upon any subtenant in actual occupation of the
premises remains uncomplied with for three days after service. Within
three days after the service of the notice the tenant, or any subtenant in
actual occupation of the premises, or any mortgagee of the term, or other
µerson interested in its continuance, may perform the condition or covenant and thereby save the lease from forfeiture except that if the cove-

535

78-36-3

JUDICIAL CODE

nan ts and conditions of the lease violated by the lessee cannot afterwards
be performed, then no notice need be given.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-36-3; L. 1981, ch. 160, § l; 1986,
ch. 137, § I.
Amendment Notes. - The 1986 amendment substituted "three days" for "five days" in

the first sentence of Subsection (5) and made
stylistic changes throughout the section.
Cross-References. - Nuisances, Title 47.
Right to recover treble damages from tenants committing waste, § 78-38-2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Cause of action.
-Default in rent.
-Prerequisites.
-Presumptions.
-When determined.
-When exists.
Federal regulations.
-Modification of state remedies.
Notice to quit.
-Administrative
claim.
-Liability of tenant.
-Prerequisites.
-Sufficiency.
-Tenancy at will.
Persons liable.
Pleadings.
-Tenancy at will.
Right of re-entry.
-Contractual
provisions.
Strict performance.
-Waiver.
Strict statutory compliance.
-Not required.
-Required.
Termination of lease.
Treble damages.
-Contract of sale.
-Intervenor.
-Lease.
Cause of action.
-Default in rent.
No cause of action for unlawful detainer
based on default in payment of rent survived
where tenant tendered rent due within three
days after service of unlawful detainer action,
regardless of defects in such notice. Dang v.
Cox Corp., 655 P.2d 658 (Utah 1982).
-Prerequisites.
Notice to quit is necessary to give rise to
cause of action. Carstensen v. Hansen, 107
Utah 234, 152 P.2d 954 (1944).
-Presumptions.
Action of unlawful detainer presupposes absence of fraud and force, as well as existence of

relation of landlord and tenant. Holladay Coal
Co. v. Kirker, 20 Utah 192, 57 P. 882 (1899).
-When determined.
Whether a cause of action exists under this
section is to be determined at the time the action is commenced. Van Zyverden v. Farrar, 15
Utah 2d 367, 393 P.2d 468 (1964).
-When exists.
Upon expiration of tenant's lease, the tenant
is subject to ouster by an unlawful detainer
action (not forcible detainer) under and pursuant to this section. Woodbury v. Bunker, 98
Utah 216, 98 P.2d 948 (1940); American Mut.
Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Jones, 102 Utah 318, 117
P.2d 293 (1941), rehearing denied, 102 Utah
328, 133 P.2d 332 (1943).
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Unless tenant has retained the right to
refuse inspection by prospective purchasers of
premises, unreasonable refusal to permit entry
of premises for that purpose constitutes unlawful detainer. Glenn v. Keyes, 107 Utah 415,
154 P.2d 642 (1944).

Federal regulations.
-Modification
of state remedies.
OPA rental and housing regulations, under
Federal Price Control Act, were binding upon
Utah courts and modified any state remedy to
extent that such remedy was in conflict with
that act. Callister v. Spencer, 113 Utah 497,
196 P.2d 714 (1948).
Notice to quit.
-Administrative
claim.
Notice to quit or pay rent served on government as required by this section was not an
administrative claim sufficient to satisfy 28
U.S.C. § 2675(a), and federal court therefore
had no jurisdiction over forcible entry and detainer action brought under Federal Tort
Claims Act. Three-M Enters., Inc. v. United
States, 548 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1977).
-Liability of tenant.
Action by lessor, after end of fixed term of
lease, to terminate lease and require lessee to
vacate premises did not terminate provision
obliging tenant to pay attorney fees, where
parties entered stipulation, while matter was
pending, that lessee considered lease in effect
and held under it after end of fixed term. Milliner v. Farmer, 24 Utah 2d 326, 471 P.2d 151
(1970).
-Prerequisites.
Notice in accordance with Subsection (5)
should precede notice to quit, and must be uncomplied with for five days after the service
before a notice to quit is in order. Fireman's
Ins. Co. v. Brown, 529 P.2d 419 (Utah 1974).
-Sufficiency.
A notice to quit is sufficient under subsection
(2) in the case of a tenancy at will, as provided
in contract of sale in case of default, where it
merely declares a forfeiture, and is not insufficient under subsection (5) because not giving
purchasers alternative of performing conditions of the agreement. Forrester v. Cook, 77
Utah 137, 292 P. 206 (1930); American Holding Co. v. Hanson, 23 Utah 2d 432, 464 P.2d
592 (1970).
Notice by landlord stating that tenants had
failed to make payments of rent due under
lease, had failed to pay utility bills, and further providing that tenants were to quit premises and deliver up possession to landlord
within fifteen days did not comply with statutory requirements under this section; in absence of compliance, landlord was not entitled

78-36-3

to maintain action for restitution of premises.
American Holding Co. v. Hanson, 23 Utah 2d
432, 464 P.2d 592 (1970).
Notice of forfeiture, while sufficient to terminate a lease for breach of covenant, is not sufficient to put lessee in unlawful detainer; the
notice to quit must be in the alternative, i.e.,
either perform or quit, before lessee becomes
subject to the provisions of this chapter.
Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc.,
558 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1976).
Lessee was not in unlawful detainer and lessor was not entitled to maintain an action under this section where lessor's notice to vacate
premises was defective in that it did not state
that lessee had the alternative of paying the
delinquent rent or surrendering the premises.
Sovereen v. Meadows, 595 P.2d 852 (Utah
1979).
The critical distinction between a notice of
unlawful detainer and a notice of forfeiture is
that the notice of forfeiture simply declares a
termination of the lease without giving the lessee the alternative of making up the deficiency. Dang v. Cox Corp., 655 P.2d 658 (Utah
1982).
A notice to a month-to-month tenant to quit
the premises need not contain the alternative
of paying rent. Ute-Cal Land Dev. v. Intermountain Stock Exch., 628 P.2d 1278 (Utah
1981).
Notice to quit which notified tenant that he
was violating substantial obligations of tenancy by conducting certain businesses on
premises, and which plainly informed tenant
that he must desist from such objectionable
practices by certain date and that, if on or before that date he failed to desist therefrom and
had not surrendered premises, action would be
commenced for restitution of premises, was not
defective because notice was not expressed in
the alternative as required by subsection (5) of
former § 104-60-3, i.e., that violation must
cease or tenancy be vacated, since such was
plain intent of notice without use of word "or."
Callister v. Spencer, 113 Utah 497, 196 P.2d
714 (1948).

-Tenancy at will.
It is only after buyer is in the status of a
tenant at will that he is amenable to the notice
provided by this section, which requires him to
vacate within five days or be guilty of an unlawful detainer. Van Zyverden v. Farrar, 15
Utah 2d 367, 393 P.2d 468 (1964).
At common law a tenant at will was not entitled to notice to quit possession. Buchanan v.
Crites, 106 Utah 428, 150 P.2d 100, 154 A.L.R.
167 (1944).
Where lease was terminated by failure of
tenant to pay rent and taxes, the tenant became a tenant at will and landlord properly
proceeded to regain possession by the proce-
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dure set forth in subsection (2) by giving notice
to vacate. Shoemaker v. Pioneer Invs., 14 Utah
2d 250, 381 P.2d 735 (1963).
Notice to purchaser who had become tenant
at will for failure to make payment was sufficient under subsection (5) even though several
months had elapsed between first and final notice. Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Dennett, 24
Utah 2d 310, 470 P.2d 406 (1970).

Persons liable.
No one but tenant of real property for term
less than life can be guilty of unlawful detainer. Holladay Coal Co. v. Kirker, 20 Utah
192, 57 P. 882 (1899).
Pleadings.
-Tenancy
at will.
Since on month-to-month tenancy owner
could recover property on fifteen-day notice, allegation in complaint that such tenant had violated substantial obligations of rental agreement was not necessary in unlawful detainer
action. Callister v. Spencer, 113 Utah 497, 196
P.2d 714 (1948).
Right of re-entry.
-Contractual
provisions.
Under contract for sale and exchange of real
estate, providing that seller at his option could
re-enter premises and be released from his obligations upon default of buyer, seller was
bound to give buyer notice of his intention to
take advantage of forfeiture provision of contract, since such provision was not self-executing. Leone v. Zuniga, 84 Utah 417, 34 P.2d 699,
94 A.L.R. 1232 (1934).
Strict performance.
-Waiver.
Acceptance by vendor of purchaser's pastdue payments under uniform real estate contract, and other conduct leading latter to believe that strict performance would not be required by vendor, imposes duty on vendor to
give purchaser reasonable notice before vendor
may insist on strict performance by purchaser.
Pacific Dev. Co. v. Stewart, 113 Utah 403, 195
P.2d 748 (1948).
Strict statutory compliance.
-Not required.
There is no reason for the strict rule that
landlord must demand the precise or exact
amount of rent due or lose his right to recover

possession of the premises. A tenant is guilty of
unlawful detainer when he continues in possession after default in payment of any rent,
and after notice in writing requiring in the alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the premises, etc. Commercial Block
Realty Co. v. Merchants' Protective Ass'n, 71
Utah 505, 267 P. 1009 (1928).

-Required.
This section, which provides a severe remedy, must be strictly complied with before the
cause of action thereon may be maintained.
Van Zyverden v. Farrar, 15 Utah 2d 367, 393
P.2d 468 (1964).
Termination of lease.
A lease may be terminated pursuant to an
unlawful detainer action. Hackford v. Snow,
657 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1982).
Treble damages.
-Contract of sale.
In a suit for amounts due under a contract of
sale of real estate, where the vendors gave notice of forfeiture of the contract only and did
not give the purchaser an alternative to pay up
or quit, as is required under this section, the
vendors were not entitled to treble damages for
unlawful detainer. Erisman v. Overman, 11
Utah 2d 258, 358 P.2d 85 (1961).
-Intervenor.
A person not actually occupying the premises who intervenes in an action to obtain possession and for damages for unlawful detainer,
and who asserts ownership and the right to
possession by the occupier as his tenant, may
be guilty of unlawful detainer and liable for
treble damages where the court finds this intervener's claim invalid. Tanner v. Lawler, 6
Utah 2d 84, 305 P.2d 882, modified on another
point, 6 Utah 2d 268, 311 P.2d 791 (1957).
-Lease.
Under a lease contract for a period of years,
in which the lessee defaulted, notice by the lessor for the lessees to quit the premises was not
sufficient for treble damages. Under such a
lease the statutes require an alternative notice
that the tenant either perform or quit before he
becomes an unlawful detainer and subject to
treble damages. Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d
59, 278 P.2d 294 (1954), distinguished, Jensen
v. Nielson, 26 Utah 2d 96, 485 P.2d 673 (1971).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord
and Tenant § 1115 et seq.; 50 Am. Jur. 2d
Landlord and Tenant § 1205 et seq.

C.J.S. -

52A C.J.S. Landlord. and Tenant

A.L.R. -

Right of landlord legally entitled

§ 758.
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to possession to dispossess tenant without legal
process, 6 A.L.R.3d 177.
Grazing or pasturage agreement as violation
of covenant in lease or provision of statute
against assigning or subletting without lessor's
consent, 71 A.L.R.3d 780.

78-36-4.

Express or implied restriction on lessee's use
of residential property for business purposes,
46 A.L.R.4th 496.
Key Numbers. - Landlord and Tenant e,,
290.

Right of tenant of agricultural lands to hold over.

In all cases of tenancy upon agricultural lands, where the tenant has held
over and retained possession for more than 60 days after the expiration of his
term without any demand of possession or notice to quit by the owner, his
designated agent, or his successor in estate, he shall be deemed to be held by
permission of the owner, his designated agent, or his successor in estate, and
shall be entitled to hold under the terms of the lease for another full year, and
shall not be guilty of an unlawful detainer during that year; and the holding
over for the 60-day period shall be taken and construed as a consent on the
part of the tenant to hold for another year.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § l; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-36-4; L. 1981, ch. 160, § 2.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 50 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord
and Tenant § 1193.
C.J.S. - 51C C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant
§ 136(3).

78-36-5.

Remedies
tenant.

Key Numbers. 114(3).

available

to tenant

Landlord and Tenant

against

e,,

under-

A tenant may take proceedings s1milar to those prescribed in this chapter to
obtain possession of the premises let to an undertenant in case of his unlawful
detention of the premises underlet to him.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-36-5.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. -49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and
Tenant § 506.
C.J.S. - 51C C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant
§ 48(1) et seq.

78-36-6.

Notice to quit -

Key Numbers. 80(3).

Landlord and Tenant

e,,

How served.

The notices required by the preceding sections may be served:
(1) by delivering a copy to the tenant personally;
(2) by sending a copy through registered or certified mail addressed to
the tenant at his place of residence;
(3) if he is absent from his place of residence or from his usual place of
business, by leaving a copy with a person of suitable age and discretion at
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either place and mailing a copy to the tenant at the address of his place of
residence or place of business; or
(4) if a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be found at the place
of residence, then by affixing a copy in a conspicuous place on the leased
property. Service upon a subtenant may be made in the same manner.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-36-6; L. 1981, ch. 160, § 3; 1986,
ch. 137, § 2; 1987, ch. 123, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1986 amendment deleted the comma at the end of Subsection (3) and deleted "and also delivering a copy
to a person there residing, if the person can be
found, and also sending a copy through the
mail addressed to the tenant at the place
where the leased property is situated" at the
end of the first sentence in Subsection (4).
The 1987 amendment deleted "either" and a

comma following "may be served" in the introductory language; substituted "a person" for
"some person" and "mailing a copy" for "sending a copy through the mail addressed" and
inserted "the address of' in Subsection (3); and
deleted "the place of residence of business cannot be ascertained or" preceding "a person" and
substituted "at the place of residence" for
"there" in the first sentence of Subsection (4).
Cross-References. - Service of process,
Rules 4, 5, U.R.C.P.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Death of landlord.
-Substitution
of parties.
Delay in bringing action.
Improper service.
-Failure
to mail.
--Leaving
copy with spouse.
-Failure
to personally serve.
--Mail.
Rules of Civil Procedure.
-Effect.
Strict statutory compliance.

Death of landlord.

Improper service.

-Substitution
of parties.
Notice served by agent oflandlord during his
lifetime did not lose its force upon landlord's
death in view of C.L. 1917, § 6513 permitting
substitution of personal representative for deceased, nor was executor under necessity of
serving another demand for possession before
bringing action, for he was entitled to carry on
the litigation from point where original party
left it. Boland v. Nihlros, 77 Utah 205, 293 P. 7
(1930).

-

Delay in bringing action.
Mere lapse of time does not operate as an
abandonment of all claim and demand under
the notice; nor does mere delay in bringing
suit, where explained, render demand for possession of the premises of no force or effect.
Boland v. Nihlros, 77 Utah 205, 293 P. 7
(1930), an action in which six years elapsed
between demand for possession on commencement of action and in which there were delays
in bringing suit to trial.

Failure to mail.

--Leaving
copy with spouse.
An action for unlawful detainer cannot be
maintained against a tenant to whom no copy
of the notice required by the statute was
mailed, although a copy was left with his wife.
Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d
446 (1952).
-Failure

to personally

serve.

--Mail.
Assuming that compliance with this section
can be waived by defendant tenant, entering
general appearance cannot have that effect. It
was not a compliance with statute for landlord,
after failing in a few attempts to find tenants
at home and serve them personally with notice,
to mail a copy of notice to quit, addressed to
them at their place of residence. Carstensen v.
Hansen, 107 Utah 234, 152 P.2d 954 (1944)
(decided under prior law).
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Rules of Civil Procedure.
-Effect.
The general provisions of Rule 4, U.R.C.P.,
relating to service do not modify the provisions
of this section, which specifically applies to service in unlawful detainer actions. Ute-Cal
Land Dev. v. Intermountain Stock Exch., 628
P.2d 1278 (Utah 1981).
Strict statutory compliance.
To hold that any method of service other

than that prescribed in the statute is sufficient
to comply with it would be to nullify the intention of the legislature. Carstensen v. Hansen,
107 Utah 234, 152 P.2d 954 (1944).
Unlawful detainer being a summary procedure, the statute must be strictly complied
with in order to enforce the obligations imposed by it. Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468,
243 P.2d 446 (1954), distinguished, Jensen v.
Nielson, 26 Utah 2d 96, 485 P.2d 673 (1971).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
and Tenant
C.J.S. § 769(1) et

2d. -

§ 1213.

50 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord

Key Numbers. 283.

52A C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant
seq.

78-36-'7. Necessary

Landlord and Tenant

ec,

parties defendant.

No person other than the tenant of the premises, and subtenant if there is
one in the actual occupation of the premises when the action is commenced,
need be made a party defendant in the proceeding, nor shall any proceeding
abate, nor the plaintiff be nonsuited, for the nonjoinder of any person who
might have been made a party defendant; but when it appears that any of the
parties served with process or appearing in the proceedings are guilty, judgment must be rendered against them. In case a person has become subtenant
of the premises in controversy after the service of any notice in this chapter
provided for, the fact that such notice was not served on such subtenant shall
constitute no defense to the action. All persons who enter under the tenant
after the commencement of the action hereunder shall be bound by the judgment the same as if they had been made parties to the action.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-36-7.
Cross-References. - Necessary joinder of
parties, Rule 19, U.R.C.P.

Nonsuit,
U.R.C.P.

dismissal

of actions,

Rule 41,

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Liability of parties.
-Intervenor.
Necessary parties.
-Agent of landlord.
-Assignor of sales contract.
Liability of parties.
-Intervenor.
A person not actually occupying the premises who intervenes in an action to obtain possession and for damages for unlawful detainer,
and who asserts ownership and the right to
possession by the occupier as his tenant, may
be guilty of unlawful detainer and liable for

treble damages where the court finds this intervenor's claim invalid. Tanner v. Lawler, 6
Utah 84, 305 P.2d 882, modified on another
point, 6 Utah 2d 268, 311 P.2d 791 (1957).
Necessary

parties.

-Agent of landlord. •
Agent of landlord is not a necessary or
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proper party in forcible detainer proceeding.
Dunbar v. Hansen, 68 Utah 398, 250 P. 982
(1926).
-Assignor
of sales contract.
It was not necessary for assignee of seller's
interest in real estate sale contract to notify
original purchaser of the forfeiture for default

or make him a defendant in the unlawful detainer action since an action for unlawful detainer is primarily against the person in possession and it is not necessary for everyone
having an interest to be made a party. Pearce
v. Shurtz, 2 Utah 2d 124, 270 P.2d 442 (1954).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Numbers. 291(6).

Am. Jur. 2d. - 50 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord
and Tenant § 1236.
C.J.S. - 52A C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant
§ 764.

78-36-8.

Landlord and Tenant

Allegations permitted in complaint appearance - Service of summons.

Time for

The plaintiff in his complaint, in addition to setting forth the facts on which
he seeks to recover, may set forth any circumstances of fraud, force, or violence which may have accompanied the alleged forcible entry, or forcible or
unlawful detainer, and claim damages therefor or compensation for the occupation of the premises, or both. If the unlawful detainer charged is after
default in the payment of rent, the complaint shall state the amount of rent
due. The court shall indorse on the summons the number of days within which
the defendant is required to appear and defend the action, which shall not be
less than three or more than 20 days from the date of service. The court may
authorize service by publication or mail for cause shown. Service by publication is complete one week after publication. Service by mail is complete three
days after mailing. The summons shall be changed in form to conform to the
time of service as ordered, and shall be served as in other cases.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-36-8; 1987, ch. 123 § 2.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment substituted "rent due" for "such rent" at
the end of the second sentence; deleted "except
when publication is necessary, in which case
the court shall direct publication for a period of
not less than one week" from the end of the
third sentence; added the present fourth, fifth,
and sixth sentences; deleted the former last

sentence, which read "The complaint shall be
filed within one day after service of summons,
if not served therewith"; and made minor phraseology and punctuation changes throughout
the first, second and third sentences.
Cross-References.
General rules of
pleadings, Rule 8, U.R.C.P.
Service of summons, Rules 4, 5, U.R.C.P.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Action to recover rent.
Damages.
-Right to demand.
Dismissal.
-Joint motion.
Necessary allegations and proof.
-Date of notice to surrender.
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Action to recover rent.
Plaintiff may bring action to recover rent
due, and a separate action in unlawful detainer
for recovery of possession and for damages.
Judgment in one action will not bar action in
the other proceeding, the issues in the two actions not being the same, and, therefore, not
being adjudicated. Voyles v. Straka, 77 Utah
171, 292 P. 913 (1930).
Damages.
-Right to demand.
The plaintiff in his complaint may not only
ask for possession of the premises, but also for
damages accruing to trial. Forrester v. Cook,
77 Utah 137, 292 P. 206 (1930).
Dismissal.
-Joint motion.
Where complaint in forcible entry and detainer action stated cause of action against one
defendant, joint demurrer (now motion to dismiss) by two defendants was properly overruled. Paxton v. Fisher, 86 Utah 408, 45 P.2d
903 (1935).
Necessary allegations and proof.
Plaintiff must allege and prove, not only that
he has right to property's possession, but also
that property is being unlawfully detained
from him, after notice to quit, served as provided by law. Barnes v. Cox, 12 Utah 47, 41 P.
557 (1895).

As a rule, all that is required to be alleged by
plaintiff, in action of forcible entry and detainer, is facts and circumstances constituting
entry or detainer complained of, and either
that he was peaceably in actual possession of
premises at time of forcible entry, or, in some
cases, that he was entitled to possession of
premises at time of forcible detainer. Holladay
Coal Co. v. Kirker, 20 Utah 192, 57 P. 882
(1899).
Plaintiff, in action of forcible entry and detainer, need not allege his estate in or ti tie to
premises, nor, with few exceptions, is he required to allege his right of possession.
Holladay Coal Co. v. Kirker, 20 Utah 192, 57
P. 882 (1899).

-Date of notice to surrender.
In action of forcible entry and detainer, held
that exact date on which notice to surrender
premises was given was wholly immaterial,
and that plaintiff was only required to aver
and prove specific fact that, subsequent to time
of unlawful entry, while defendants were in
possession and prior to commencement of action, sufficient notice was given and that surrender of premises by defendants was refused
for period of three days thereafter. Holladay
Coal Co. v. Kirker, 20 Utah 192, 57 P. 882
(1899).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 35 Am. Jur. 2d Forcible
Entry and Detainer § 38 et seq.
C.J.S. - 36A C.J.S. Forcible Entry and Detainer §§ 39, 42, 44.

78-36-8.5.

Possession
dies.

Key Numbers. tainer
24.

bond of plaintiff-

Forcible Entry and De-

Alternative reme-

(1) At any time between the filing of his complaint and the entry of final
judgment, the plaintiff may execute and file a possession bond. The bond may
be in the form of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified funds, or a property
bond executed by two persons who own real property in the state and who are
not parties to the action. The court shall approve the bond in an amount that
is the probable amount of costs of suit and damages which may result to the
defendant if the suit has been improperly instituted. The bond shall be payable to the clerk of the court for the benefit of the defendant for all costs and
damages actually adjudged against the plaintiff. The plaintiff shall notify the
defendant that he has filed a possession bond. This notice shall be served in
the same manner as service of summons and shall inform the defendant of all
of the alternative remedies and procedures under Subsection (2).
(2) The following are alternative remedies and procedures applicable to an
action if the plaintiff files a possession bond under Subsection (1):
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(a) With respect to an unlawful detainer action based solely upon nonpayment of rent or utilities, the existing contract shall remain in force
and the complaint shall be dismissed if the defendant, within three days
of the service of the notice of the possession bond, pays accrued rent,
utility charges, any late fee, and other costs, including attorney's fees, as
provided in the rental agreement.
(b) The defendant may remain in possession if he executes and files a
counter bond in the form of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified funds,
or a property bond executed by two persons who own real property in the
state and who are not parties to the action. The form of the bond is at the
defendant's option. The bond shall be payable to the clerk of the court.
The defendant shall file the bond prior to the expiration of three days
from the date he is served with notice of the filing of plaintiffs possession
bond. The court shall approve the bond in an amount that is the probable
amount of costs of suit and actual damages that may result to the plaintiff
if the defendant has improperly withheld possession. The court shall consider prepaid rent to the owner as a portion of the defendant's total bond.
(c) The defendant, upon demand, shall be granted a hearing to be held
prior to the expiration of three days from the date the defendant is served
with notice of the filing of plaintiffs possession bond.
(3) If the defendant does not elect and comply with a remedy under Subsection (2) within the required time, the plaintiff, upon ex parte motion, shall be
granted an order of restitution. 'fhe constable of the precinct or the sheriff of
the county where the property is situated shall return possession of the property to the plaintiff promptly.
(4) If the defendant demands a hearing under Subsection (2)(c), and if the
court rules after the hearing that the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the
property, the constable or sheriff shall promptly return possession of the property to the plaintiff. If at the hearing the court allows the defendant to remain
in possession and further issues remain to be adjudicated between the parties,
the court shall require the defendant to post a bond as required in Subsection
(2)(b). If at the hearing the court rules that all issues between the parties can
be adjudicated without further court proceedings, the court shall, upon adjudicating those issues, enter judgment on the merits.
History: C. 1953, 78-36-8.5, enacted by L.
1981,ch. 160, § 4;L. 1983,ch.209,§
1; 1987,
ch. 123, § 3.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment rewrote this section to the extent that a
detailed analysis is impracticable.
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Cross-References. - Contracts of suretyship, § 31A-22-101 et seq.
County sheriff, Chapter 22 of Title 17.
Service of summons, Rules 4, 5, U.R.C.P.

Proof required by plaintiff -

Defense.

On the trial of any proceeding for any forcible entry or forcible detainer the
plaintiff shall only be required to show, in addition to the forcible entry or
forcible detainer complained of, that he was peaceably in the actual possession
at the time of the forcible entry, or was entitled to the possession at the time of
the forcible detainer. The defendant may show in his defense that he or his
ancestors, or those whose interest in such premises he claims, had been in the
quiet possession thereof for the space of one whole year continuously next
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before the commencement of the proceedings, and that his interest therein is
not then ended or determined; and such showing is a bar to the proceedings.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-36-9.

Cross-References. - Limitation of actions,
real property, § 78-12-2 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Defenses and counterclaims.
-Tenant.
--Counterclaim.
-Tender of rent.
Possession.
-Constructive.
--Right
of entry.
-Public land.
Security interest in personal property.
-Partial
possession of premises.
Title adjudication.
-Color of title.
--State
lease.
-Deed.
--Fraud
and duress.
-Tax title.

Defenses and counterclaims.
-Tenant.
--Counterclaim.
Defendant in forcible detainer action cannot
file counterclaim, and is limited to defenses
predicated on nonexistence of relationship of
landlord and tenant between parties, nonexistence of valid lease or contract to pay rent, or
that no rent is due; but he may bring suit in
court of equity to determine rights and enjoin
forcible detainer proceeding pending such determination. Dunbar v. Hansen, 68 Utah 398,
250 P. 982 (1926) (decided under prior law).
Under Rule 13, U.R.C.P., counterclaim alleging misrepresentation and fraud concerning
the contract of purchase of the involved property could be asserted by defendants in an unlawful detainer action. White v. District Court,
232 P.2d 785 (Utah 1951).
-Tender of rent.
A tender by tenant of rent, if insufficient in
amount, is no tender at all, and the fact that
subsequent tenders were, in the aggregate,
equivalent to the rent due, will not make the
tender sufficient and valid. Commercial Block
Realty Co. v. Merchants' Protective Ass'n, 71
Utah 505, 267 P. 1009 (1928).
Possession.
-Constructive.
--Right
of entry.
Under an allegation of possession plaintiff

can show constructive possession, in that it is
an association of qualified persons in possession of coal mines upon which sufficient money
has been expended to give a preference right of
entry to 640 acres of surrounding land under
the law. Holladay Coal Co. v. Kirker, 20 Utah
192, 57 P. 882 (1899).

-Public land.
Possession of public land is prima facie evidence of right to possession as against a mere
intruder or trespasser. Wilson v. Triumph
Consol. Mining Co., 19 Utah 66, 56 P. 300, 75
Am. St. R. 718 (1899).
Security interest in personal property.
-Partial possession of premises.
Plaintiffs security interest in bar equipment
did not constitute partial possession of premises, and plaintiff could not maintain action for
forcible entry or for wrongful eviction.
Wangsgard v. Fitzpatrick, 542 P.2d 194 (Utah
1975).
Title adjudication.
In action for possession and damages for unlawful detention of farm lands, trial court
erred in rendering judgment and decree in defendant's favor quieting title to premises, since
question of title is not ordinarily involved in
such actions. Welling v. Abbott, 52 Utah 240,
173 P. 245 (1918).
It is not proper to quiet title to real estate in
action of forcible entry or in action for unlaw-
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ful detainer. Thomson v. Reynolds, 53 Utah
437, 174 P. 164 (1918).
-Color of title.
--State
lease.
In suit for forcible entry, it was proper to
introduce lease from State Land Board (now
Board of State Lands) to plaintiffs to show that
they held under color of title and that it was
necessary for defendants to resort to statute to
obtain possession. Paxton v. Deardon, 94 Utah
149, 76 P.2d 561 (1938).

-Deed.
--Fraud
and duress.
It is not intention of forcible entry and de-

tainer ·proceedings to try title or equities between parties, so that, in such an action, defendant was not permitted to show that deed executed by him to plaintiff was obtained from
him by means of fraud and duress since such
defense would constitute an attempt to dispute
landlord's title. Williams v. Nelson, 65 Utah
304,237 P. 217 (1925).

-Tax title.
Affirmative defense and counterclaim setting up tax title and seeking to have property
in question quieted in defendant, held not to lie
in forcible detainer action. Woodbury v.
Bunker, 98 Utah 216, 98 P.2d 948 (1940).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 35 Am. Jur. 2d Forcible
Entry and Detainer §§ 42 to 44.
C.J.S. - 36A C.J.S. Forcible Entry and Detainer § 53 et seq.
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Key Numbers. tainer
29.

Forcible Entry and De-

Judgment for restitution, damages, and rent Immediate enforcement - Treble damages.

(1) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon default. A judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff shall include an order for the restitution
of the premises. If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after neglect or
failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or agreement under
which the property is held, or after default in the payment of rent, the judgment shall also declare the forfeiture of the lease or agreement.
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or upon
the defendant's default, shall also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff
from any of the following: •
(a) forcible entry;
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer;
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, if waste is
alleged in the complaint and proved at trial; and
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful detainer is after
default in the payment of rent.
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for
three times the amount of the damages assessed under Subsections (2)(a)
through (2)(c), and for reasonable attorney's fees, if they are provided for in
the lease or agreement.
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after default in the payment of
the rent, execution upon the judgment shall be issued immediately after the
entry of the judgment. In all cases, the judgment may be issued and enforced
immediately.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-36-10; L. 1981, ch. 160, § 5; 1987,
ch. 123, § 4.
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amendment divided the section into subsections; di-

vided the former first sentence into the present
second and third sentences of Subsection (1) by
deleting "and" and making a related punctuation change; added the present first sentence of
Subsection (1); rewrote the second sentence of
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Subsection (1); inserted "or upon the defendant's default", substituted "resulting" for "occasioned" and "from any of the following" for
"by any" and made punctuation changes in
Subsection (2); deleted "or by any" and made a
punctuation change in Subsection (2)(a); deleted "and any amount found due the plaintiff
by reason of" and made a punctuation change
in Subsection (2)(b); substituted "during the
defendant's tenancy, if waste is" for "by the
defendant during the tenancy," and "at trial;
and" for "on the trial, and find" in Subsection
(2)(c); deleted "any" preceding "rent due" and
"and" from the end, and made a punctuation
change in Subsection (l)(d); substituted "entered" for "rendered", a comma for "and" following "for the rent", and the language begin-

78-36-10

ning "assessed under Subsections (2)(a)" for
"thus assessed" and deleted "guilty of the forcible entry, or forcible or unlawful detainer,"
following "against the defendant" in Subsection (3)"; substituted "If" for "When" at the
beginning of Subsection (4); deleted "an" preceding "unlawful detainer" and "execution
upon the judgment shall be issued immediately
after the entry of the judgement" plus a comma
following "payment of the rent" in the first
sentence of Subsection (4); and inserted "issued
and" and made a punctuation change in the
second sentence of Subsection (4).
Cross-References. - Fees of constable,
§ 21-3-3.
Fees of sheriff, § 21-2-4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Damages
-Loss of value.
-Nominal damages.
-Rent and profits.
-Treble .damages.
Execution upon judgment.
-Failure to pay rent.
Grace period.
-Attempt to use.
Real estate sale contracts.
-Liquidated
damages.
Separate action for rent.
Statutory remedy.
-Tort liability for noncompliance.

Damages.
-Loss of value.
The loss of the value of the use and occupation of the premises, during the period when
the premises were unlawfully withheld from
plaintiff, is "damage" suffered. Forrester v.
Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292 P. 206 (1930).
-Nominal damages.
Where husband and wife occupy the premises, and the notice required by statute is
served only on the wife so that an action for
unlawful detainer can be maintained merely
against her, the successful plaintiff is entitled
to nominal damages only, since, even if the
wife had moved, the plaintiff would have had
no right to possession of the premises as
against the husband, and he thus suffered no
actual damage by reason of the fact that the
wife remained there. Perkins v. Spencer, 121
Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446 (1952), distinguished,
Carlson v. Hamilton, 8 Utah 2d 272, 332 P.2d
989 (1958).

-Rent and profits.
Damages recoverable must be the natural
and proximate consequences of the unlawful
detainer and nothing more. Rents and profits,
or rental value of the premises, during detention are included in damages. Rental value or
reasonable value of the use and occupation of
the premises becomes an element of damages
for retaining possession. This is not rent, it is
damages. Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292
P. 206 (1930).
This section was not designed to provide a
summary remedy for the recovery of rent. The
language thereof that "judgment shall be rendered ... for the rent," etc., is applicable only
when rent is claimed in the complaint for it
would be improper in any case to award a judgment for what is not so claimed. Voyles v.
Straka, 77 Utah 171, 292 P. 913 (1930).
-Treble damages.
After the termination of the tenancy by notice to quit, the person in unlawful possession
is not owing rent under contract, but must respond in damages. This is not rent, but "dam-
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ages," and, therefore, may be trebled. Forrester
v. Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292 P. 206 (1930).
Where all issues were decided in plaintiffs
favor, trial court's refusal to treble damages,
awarded plaintiff by jury, was error. Eccles v.
Union Pac. Coal Co., 15 Utah 14, 48 P. 148
(1897).
Plaintiffs failure to comply with the provisions of § 78-36-8 converted his action for unlawful detainer into one at common law for
ejectment and defeated his right under this
section to treble damages. Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317. (Utah
1976).
A person not actually occupying the premises who intervenes in an action to obtain possession and for damages for unlawful detainer,
and who asserts ownership and the right to
possession by the occupier as his tenant, may
be guilty of unlawful detainer and liable for
treble damages where the court finds this intervener's claim invalid. Tanner v. Lawler, 6
Utah 2d 84, 305 P.2d 882, modified on another
point, 6 Utah 2d 268, 311 P.2d 791 (1957).
Where tenant merely remains over upon termination oflease and increase in rent, but does
not contest landlord's right to terminate lease
or his right to possession, tenant is conclusively presumed to have acquiesced in increased rental and landlord is not entitled to
treble damages. Belnap v. Fox, 69 Utah 15, 251
P. 1073 (1926).
The provision for treble damages is highly
penal, and, therefore, subject to strict construction. It will be observed that only damages are
to be trebled, not rents and waste. But the language is mandatory making it compulsory
upon the court to render and enter judgment
for three times the amount of the damages assessed, after a finding of damages by the jury.
And rents which may not be trebled are such
as accrue before termination of the tenancy.
Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292 P. 206
(1930).

Execution upon judgment.
-Failure to pay rent.
When landlord prevails in unlawful detainer
action because of tenant's failure to pay rent
under a lease which has not expired, he cannot
have any judgment unless he shows that there
is rent due and the amount thereof; when that
is done, the tenant has five days in which to
pay the judgment and costs, and then he will
be restored to the premises under his lease.
The landlord cannot prevent the tenant from
paying the judgment and regaining his rights

under the unexpired lease by the device of failing to have the amount of rent due included in
the judgment. In such a case unless the judgment determines the amount of rent due, it is
defective, and the restitution part cannot be
lawfully enforced. Monter v. Kratzers Specialty Bread Co., 29 Utah 2d 18, 504 P.2d 40
(1972).

Grace period.
-Attempt to use.
Where evicted lessees asserted that they
were not afforded the five-day post-judgment
grace period to pay the delinquency and preserve the lease, the issue was moot since the
defendants did not make an attempt to take
advantage of the grace period. Allred v. Smith,
674 P.2d 99 (Utah 1983) (decided under facts
existing prior to 1981 amendment).
Real estate sale contracts.
-Liquidated
damages.
By common practice in Utah, an action in
unlawful detainer may be brought against a
vendee of realty whose payments are far in arrears, after sufficient demands for payment
have been made and subsequent notice to quit
has been given by vendor; where a vendor does
cancel the contract for sale and bring such an
action, vendee may be required, if the contract
so provides, to forfeit as liquidated damages all
money theretofore paid to the vendor along
with all improvements placed on the land by
the vendee, unless such forfeiture would be unconscionable. Weyher v. Peterson, 16 Utah 2d
278, 399 P.2d 438 (1965).
Separate action for rent.
Judgment in unlawful detainer for restitution of the premises and for treble damages
does not bar action to recover rent due, rent not
being claimed or adjudged in the possessory
action, because the right to recover possession
by summary remedy, and the claim for rent, do
not constitute one entire and indivisible cause
of action. Voyles v. Straka, 77 Utah 171,292 P.
913 (1930).
Statutory remedy.
-Tort liability for noncompliance.
A landlord who is entitled to possession
must, on the refusal of the tenant to surrender
the premises, resort to the remedy given by
law to secure it. A violation of that duty set by
the statute gives rise to an action for damages,
not in an action under the forcible entry and
detainer statute but as a separate tort. King v.
Firm, 3 Utah 2d 419, 285 P.2d 1114 (1955).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - Forfeiture Under Installment Land Contracts in Utah, 1981 Utah
L. Rev. 803, 807.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 35 Am, Jur. 2d Forcible
Entry and Detainer § 53.
C.J.S. - 36A C.J.S. Forcible Entry and Detainer § 68 et seq.

78-36-11.

A.L.R. - Landlord and tenant: respective
rights in excess rent when landlord relets at
higher rent during lessee's term, 50 A.L.R.4th
403.
Key Numbers. - Forcible Entry and Detainer e=> 38.

Time for appeal.

Either party may, within ten days, appeal from the judgment rendered.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-36-11.

Cross-References.
- Stay of execution
pending appeal, Rule 62, U.R.C.P.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Applicability of section.
-Held applicable.
-Held inapplicable.
Failure to comply.
-Loss of jurisdiction.
Applicability

of section.

-Held applicable.
Fact that demurrer to complaint required
trial court to construe written instrument to
determine whether plaintiff was entitled to
any relief did not change action from one of
unlawful detainer, so that it was necessary to
take appeal within ten days as provided by this
section. Madsen v. Chournos, 102 Utah 247,
129 P.2d 986 (1942).
Appeal from dismissal of unlawful detainer
action for failure to amend complaint within
time allowed was governed by this section.
Madsen v. Chournos, 102 Utah 247, 129 P.2d
986 (1942).
Time for taking appeal in forcible entry and
detainer suit was governed by this section,
which is valid, and general provision providing
for appeals was not applicable. Hunsaker v.
Harris, 37 Utah 226, 109 P. 1 (1910).
A party had ten days, as provided by this
section, and not one month, as provided by former Rule 73(a), U.R.C.P., in which to appeal
from a judgment for unlawful detainer. UteCal Land Dev. v. Intermountain Stock Exch.,
628 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1981).
Fact that judgment rested on construction of
whether lease was terminated upon sale of
property did not change action from one in unlawful detainer, so that it was necessary to
take appeal within ten days as provided by this

section. Brandley v. Lewis, 97 Utah 217, 92
P.2d 338 (1939).
-Held inapplicable.
Where a complaint contained two causes of
action asking for treble damages for forcible
entry and detainer, one cause of action for a
temporary restraining order and temporary injunction, and a fourth cause of action for damages for breach of a lease; the hybrid nature of
the plaintiffs action prevented this statute
from controlling the time limitation for filing
an appeal. Fashions Four v. Fashion Place
Assocs., 681 P.2d 830 (Utah 1984).
Where plaintiff in forcible detainer action
was held liable on counterclaim, time for appeal was not governed by ten-day limitation of
this section, but by general six-month statute,
ten-day limit of this section being applicable
only to judgments in forcible detainer. Dunbar
v. Hansen, 68 Utah 398, 250 P. 982 (1926).
Ten-day period for appeal provided in forcible entry and detainer cases was inapplicable
to appeal from money judgment entered for
landlord after recovery of possession, sixmonth period of general statute being applicable. Belnap v. Fox, 69 Utah 15, 251 P. 1073
(1926).
Where, in first count, plaintiff sought to recover possession of real estate, and in second
count sought to quiet title to certain land adjoining property involved in first cause of action, and it appeared that case was tried as
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action in equity, plaintiff could not defeat appeal by contending that action was one of forcible detainer. Ottenheimer v. Mountain States
Supply Co., 56 Utah 190, 188 P. 1117 (1920).
Failure to comply.

!ants on July 1 and they did not file notice of
appeal until July 15, appeal was not timely
filed and Supreme Court was without jurisdiction to hear it. Coombs v. Johnson, 26 Utah 2d
8, 484 P.2d 155 (1971).

-Loss of jurisdiction.
Where judgment was entered against appelCOLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 35 Am. Jur. 2d Forcible
Entry and Detainer § 55.
C.J.S. - 36A C.J.S. Forcible Entry and Detainer § 90,

78-36-12.

Key Numbers. tainer e=> 43.

Forcible Entry and De-

Exclusion of tenant without judicial process prohibited - Abandoned premises excepted.

It is unlawful for an owner to willfully exclude a tenant from the tenant's
premises in any manner except by judicial process, provided, an owner or his
agent shall not be prevented from removing the contents of the leased premises under Subsection 78-36-12.6(2) and retaking the premises and attempting
to rent them at a fair rental value when the tenant has abandoned the premises.
History: C. 1953, 78-36-12, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 160, § 6.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. Landlord and tenant: respective
rights in excess rent when landlord relets at

78-36-12.3.

higher rent during lessee's term, 50 A.L.R.4th
403.

Definitions.

(1) "Willful exclusion" means preventing the tenant from entering into the
premises with intent to deprive the tenant of such entry.
(2) "Owner" means the actual owner of the premises and shall also have the
same meaning as landlord under common law and the statutes of this state.
(3) "Abandonment" is presumed in either of the following situations:
(a) The tenant has not notified the owner that he or she will be absent
from the premises, and the tenant fails to pay rent within 15 days after
the due date, and there is no reasonable evidence other than the presence
of the tenant's personal property that the tenant is occupying the premises; or
(b) The tenant has not notified the owner that he or she will be absent
from the premises, and the tenant fails to pay rent when due and the
tenant's personal property has been removed from the dwelling unit and
there is no reasonable evidence that the tenant is occupying the premises.
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History: C. 1953, 78-36-12.3, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 160, § 7.

78-36-12.6.

Abandoned
premises
Retaking
rerenting by owner - Liability of tenant sonal property of tenant left on premises.

and
Per-

(1) In the event of abandonment the owner may retake the premises and
attempt to rent them at a fair rental value and the tenant who abandoned the
premises shall be liable:
(a) for the entire rent due for the remainder of the term; or
(b) for rent accrued during the period necessary to re-rent the premises
at a fair rental value, plus the difference between the fair rental value
and the rent agreed to in the prior rental agreement, plus a reasonable
commission for the renting of the premises and the costs, if any, necessary
to restore the rental unit to its condition when rented by the tenant less
normal wear and tear. This subsection applies, if less than Subsection (a)
notwi-thstanding that the owner did not re-rent the premises.
(2) If the tenant has abandoned the premises and has left personal property
on the premises, the owner is entitled to remove the property from the dwelling, store it for the tenant, and recover actual moving and storage costs from
the tenant. The owner shall make reasonable efforts to notify the tenant of the
location of the personal property; however, if the property has been in storage
for over 30 days and the tenant has made no reasonable effort to recover it,
the owner may sell the property and apply the proceeds toward any amount
the tenant owes. Any money left over from the sale of the property shall be
handled as specified in § 78-44-18. Nothing contained in this act shall be in
derogation of or alter the owner's rights under Chapter 3, Title 38.
History: C. 1953, 78-36-12.6, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 160, § 8; 1986, ch. 194, § 20.
Amendment Notes. - The 1986 amendment moved the Subsection (1) designation to
the beginning of the section and made minor
word and stylistic changes; and in Subsection
(2) substituted "§ 78-44-18" for "§ 78-44-11"
and made minor word and stylistic changes.

Meaning of "this act". - The term "this
act," referred to in Subsection (2), means Laws
1981, Chapter
160, which appears as
§§ 78-36-3,
78-36-4, 78-36-6, 78-36-8.5,
78-36-10, 78-36-12 and 78-36-12.3.
Cross-References. - Residential renters'
deposits, Chapter 17 of Title 57.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. - Landlord and tenant: respective
rights in excess rent when landlord relets at

higher rent during lessee's term, 50 A.L.R.4th
403.
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